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CLOSURE PROVISIONS IN MDL SETTLEMENTS
D. Theodore Rave*
Closure has value in mass litigation. Defendants often insist on it as a
condition of settlement, and plaintiffs who can deliver it may be able to
command a premium. But in multidistrict litigation (MDL), which currently
makes up over one-third of the federal docket, closure depends on
individual claimants deciding to participate in a global settlement.
Accordingly, MDL settlement designers often include terms designed to
encourage claimants to opt in to the settlement and discourage them from
continuing to litigate. Some of these terms have been criticized as unduly
coercive and as benefiting the negotiating parties—the defendant and the
lead lawyers for the plaintiffs—at claimants’ expense. But closure
strategies vary widely and operate on claimants in complex ways. This
Article examines closure provisions in recent publicly available MDL
settlements. It creates a taxonomy of closure strategies, exploring how they
work to ensure claimant participation and how they affect claimant choice
and welfare. And it closes with a call for MDL judges to take a more active
role in supervising and evaluating the terms of global settlements in MDLs.
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INTRODUCTION
Peace has value in mass litigation.1 Indeed, securing sufficient closure is
often critical to making settlement possible. And the procedural vehicle
that has come to dominate the mass litigation landscape—multidistrict
litigation, or MDL—provides a fertile environment for global settlement of
the defendant’s liability to potentially thousands of claimants.2 In MDL,
similar cases in federal courts all over the country are transferred to a single
district judge for consolidated pretrial proceedings with the plan that they
will eventually be sent back to their original courts for trial.3 But that
almost never happens, as the goal (and typical endgame) of MDL is, and
has always been, to achieve global resolution.4
In MDL, peace depends on individual claimants deciding to participate in
a global settlement. Unlike the more familiar class action, where absent
class members can be bound to a settlement if they do not opt out,5 an MDL
consists of plaintiffs who have hired lawyers and filed their own lawsuits.
And those suits generally cannot be settled en masse unless the claimants
affirmatively opt into the deal.
So when crafting a global settlement, the negotiating parties—typically
the defendant and the lawyers appointed by the MDL judge to the plaintiffs’
steering committee (PSC)—have to find ways to ensure that enough
1. See, e.g., D. Theodore Rave, Governing the Anticommons in Aggregate Litigation,
66 VAND. L. REV. 1183 (2013).
2. See, e.g., Edward F. Sherman, The MDL Model for Resolving Complex Litigation If
a Class Action Is Not Possible, 82 TUL. L. REV. 2205, 2223 (2008).
3. 28 U.S.C. § 1407(a) (2012).
4. See Andrew D. Bradt, “A Radical Proposal”: The Multidistrict Litigation Act of
1968, 165 U. PA. L. REV. (forthcoming 2017) (manuscript at 55), http://law.seattleu.edu/
Documents/CivProWorkshop/Bradt_MDL.pdf [https://perma.cc/4ZBM-TPMP].
5. See FED. R. CIV. P. 23(b)(3).
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claimants participate in whatever alternative procedure they have set up to
resolve claims.6 MDL settlements thus often include terms designed to
encourage claimants to opt into the settlement and discourage them from
continuing to litigate. These closure provisions range from walk-away
participation thresholds below which the defendant can back out of the deal
to bonus payments as the number of claimants participating approaches 100
percent to requirements that participating lawyers recommend settling to all
of their clients and withdraw from representing those who refuse.
The risk that MDL settlements can include terms that benefit the
negotiating parties more than claimants is well recognized.7 Indeed, a
central feature of MDL is the complex principal-agent problem it presents.
Although, as a formal matter, each claimant has hired a lawyer and filed an
individual lawsuit, claimants who are sucked into an MDL have little actual
control over the litigation; lawyers on the PSC make the important
decisions.8 And in settlement negotiations, the PSC’s interests may align
more with the defendant’s in getting a deal done than with the claimants’
interests in maximizing individual recoveries. The PSC might thus be
tempted to offer the defendant finality at claimants’ expense. But the everpresent risk of agent disloyalty does not necessarily mean that global
settlements emerging from MDLs are bad deals. Closure may be what the
defendant demands in exchange for compensation, and claimants who can
deliver it may be able to command a premium for doing so. The real trick
is in telling the difference, and that is no easy feat.
A first step toward being able to evaluate the fairness of closure
provisions in MDL settlements is to understand how they work. Because
they tend to strongly encourage claimants to accept the deal and provide
opportunities for defendants to back out if too few do, it can be tempting to
think that closure provisions generally benefit defendants at claimants’
expense.9 But closure strategies operate in different ways with different
effects on claimants’ choices and welfare. Some closure provisions can be
quite coercive, leaving claimants vulnerable to sweetheart deals that foist
inadequate settlements on them while handsomely rewarding the PSC with
6. Cf. D. Theodore Rave, Settlement, ADR, and Class Action Superiority, 5 J. TORT L.
91 (2014) (arguing that settlements in mass litigation are a form of alternative dispute
resolution).
7. See, e.g., Elizabeth Chamblee Burch, Monopolies in Multidistrict Litigation, 70
VAND. L. REV. 67 (2016); Elizabeth Chamblee Burch & Margaret S. Williams, Repeat
Players in Multidistrict Litigation: The Social Network, 102 CORNELL L. REV. (forthcoming
2017) (manuscript at 5–6), http://ssrn.com/abstract=2724637 [https://perma.cc/XRK5LWDB]; Howard M. Erichson, The Trouble with All-or-Nothing Settlements, 58 KAN. L.
REV. 979 (2010); Howard M. Erichson & Benjamin C. Zipursky, Consent Versus Closure,
96 CORNELL L. REV. 265 (2011).
8. See Charles Silver, The Responsibilities of Lead Lawyers and Judges in Multidistrict
Litigations, 79 FORDHAM L. REV. 1985, 1986 (2011).
9. See, e.g., Burch & Williams, supra note 7, at 5 (“All of the examined settlements
featured at least one provision that encouraged closure and finality (which benefits the
defendant), and nearly all settlements contained some provision that increased lead
plaintiffs’ lawyers’ fees.”); see also Burch, supra note 7, at 143–44 (effectively equating
automatic-enrollment provisions with higher walk-away thresholds and lawyerrecommendation provisions).
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common benefit fees. But other closure provisions may be useful tools for
claimants to credibly offer the defendant peace in exchange for a premium.
In this Article, I examine several closure strategies employed in publicly
available MDL settlements.10 Settlements, by their very nature, are flexible
and do not follow preset rules. Settlement designers seeking closure have,
accordingly, tailored their strategies to the unique needs of different
MDLs.11 And they frequently include multiple terms that work together in
complex ways to encourage claimant participation. In the taxonomy below,
I attempt to group closure provisions into six categories reflecting different
strategies for encouraging claimants to participate in global settlements
instead of going it alone: terms that (1) define the defendant’s exposure, (2)
increase the value of participating in the settlement, (3) impair the litigation
value of claims outside the settlement, (4) change the default rule to
participation, (5) prevent lawyers from cherry-picking, and (6) alter the
market for legal services.
These categories overlap in many ways. For example, terms that limit
lawyer cherry-picking might also impair the litigation value of claims
outside the settlement and alter the market for legal services. Some terms
also work together as complements. A walk-away provision, for example,
might create strategic dynamics that call for a lawyer-recommendation
requirement, enforced by a lawyer-withdrawal provision, which, in turn, is
made more effective by limits on lawyer advertising and referrals. But
grouping these various (and often complementary) settlement terms into
different categories can be useful for thinking about how they work to
achieve closure and some of the problems that they raise.
I conclude with some thoughts on the role of the MDL judge when it
comes to settlement. I have argued elsewhere that MDL judges should
actively evaluate and express an opinion on global settlements in MDLs,

10. For identifying MDL settlements worthy of examination, I am indebted to Elizabeth
Burch’s and Margaret Williams’s impressive studies of recent MDL settlements and the
repeat-player lawyers who crafted them. See Burch, supra note 7; Burch & Williams, supra
note 7. For a survey of terms that negotiating parties sometimes put in class action
settlements to benefit themselves instead of class members, see Howard M. Erichson,
Aggregation as Disempowerment: Red Flags in Class Action Settlements, 92 NOTRE DAME
L. REV. 859 (2016).
11. Many of the MDL settlements I examine are nonclass aggregate settlements. This is
no surprise given the U.S. Supreme Court’s hostility toward resolving mass torts—which
make up the bulk of MDL cases—through class action settlements. See, e.g., Robert H.
Klonoff, The Decline of Class Actions, 90 WASH. U. L. REV. 729 (2013); Samuel Issacharoff,
Professor, N.Y.U. Sch. of Law, Snapshot of MDL Caseload Statistics, Presentation at MassTort MDL Program at Duke University Law School 3 (Oct. 8, 2015), https://law.duke.edu/
sites/default/files/centers/judicialstudies/snapshot_mdl_caseload_statistics.pptx (“[P]roducts
liability makes up 92% of all pending MDL actions.”) [https://perma.cc/8YEK-Y69R]. But
several high profile MDLs have recently been resolved in class action settlements, and
closure matters in class settlements too. See, e.g., Richard A. Nagareda, Closure in Damage
Class Settlements: The Godfather Guide to Opt-Out Rights, 2003 U. CHI. LEGAL F. 141. It
is important not to draw too rigid a line between class and nonclass settlements in the MDL
context. Claimants with positive-value claims who have filed their own lawsuits are likely
to consciously decide to participate or not, whether the settlement is structured as a class
action where they must opt out or a nonclass aggregate settlement where they must opt in.
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even when structured as private, nonclass aggregate settlements.12 The
complexity of these settlements and the risk that dealmakers may try to use
closure provisions to foist an unattractive deal on claimants only heightens
the need for scrutiny by an MDL judge. It can be difficult for claimants to
figure out on their own whether peace is worth the price. But for judges to
effectively evaluate—and signal to claimants—whether an MDL settlement
is fair, they need to understand how closure provisions work and be able to
tell the difference between terms designed to prevent strategic holdouts and
those designed to stifle genuine dissent. Thus, the following taxonomy
attempts to break these provisions down and analyze how each of the
various terms works to promote closure and affects claimant choice.
I. TERMS THAT DEFINE THE DEFENDANT’S EXPOSURE
For claimants to offer the defendant peace through settlement, the
negotiating parties need to be able to define the extent of the defendant’s
exposure. Walk-away provisions and case-census provisions fulfill this
function.
A. Walk-Away Provisions
When a defendant offers to settle claims on a global basis, it opens itself
up to the risk of adverse selection. Crafting a settlement that precisely
values thousands of claims can be costly. Parties, therefore, typically group
claims into rough categories. Claimants—and in particular claimants’
lawyers—tend to know more about the relative strength of their individual
claims than the defendant.13 So if the defendant makes an open-ended offer
to settle with all claimants who want to, the ones with the weakest claims
within any given category will be the first on board. As a result, the
defendant risks overpaying the weakest claims, only to be left facing the
strongest claims in continued litigation.14 If the defendant is going to put
real money on the table, it needs assurance that it is buying something
approaching total peace, not just a collection of the weakest claims. Walkaway provisions, which are ubiquitous in MDL settlements (class and
nonclass alike), give the defendant just that.
A walk-away provision allows the defendant to back out of the settlement
if too few claimants sign on. There are many variations. The settlement
can be a true all-or-nothing offer, which allows the defendant to back out if
even a single claimant refuses to settle.15 More typically, the settlement
will specify a lower participation threshold, say 95 percent of claimants,
12. Andrew D. Bradt & D. Theodore Rave, The Information-Forcing Role of the Judge
in Multidistrict Litigation, 105 CALIF. L. REV. (forthcoming 2017) (manuscript at 1),
https://papers.ssrn.com/sol3/papers2.cfm?abstract_id=2828461
[https://perma.cc/JSJ9-GJ
AE].
13. See, e.g., Rave, supra note 1, at 1193–94.
14. See id.
15. E.g., Master Settlement Agreement §§ 6–7, In re Fosamax Prods. Liab. Litig., No.
06-md-1789 (S.D.N.Y. Mar. 24, 2014) [hereinafter Fosamax Settlement] (requiring 100
percent participation).
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below which the defendant can walk away.16 The walk-away threshold can
also be tailored to ensure that a subset of claimants (e.g., those with a
particular type of injury or even those represented by specific lawyers) is
included.17 Indeed the threshold need not even be specified. In the NFL
concussion settlement, for example, the defendant retained an absolute right
to terminate the settlement for a fixed period of time after learning how
many claimants opted out.18
The consequences of triggering the walk-away provision also vary. It
could be a nuclear option: the defendant can blow up the whole deal if the
threshold is not met.19 Or the walk-away provision could include a less
drastic option, such as allowing the defendant to reduce the settlement
amount proportionally if too few claimants participate.20
Whatever its precise structure, a walk-away provision allows the
defendant to change its mind about the settlement once it sees how the deal
is shaping up. If too few claimants (or the wrong kinds) are opting in, the
defendant need not overpay for weak claims; it can back out of the deal.
This protection from adverse selection allows the defendant to put more

16. See, e.g., 2015 ASR Settlement Agreement § 17.1.1, In re DePuy Orthopaedics, Inc.
Hip Implant Prods. Liab. Litig., No. 10-md-2197 (N.D. Ohio Mar. 2, 2015) [hereinafter
DePuy II Settlement] (setting a 94 percent walk-away threshold); Settlement Agreement
§ 17.1.1, In re DePuy Orthopaedics, Inc. Hip Implant Prods. Liab. Litig., No. 10-md-2197
(N.D. Ohio Nov. 19, 2013) [hereinafter DePuy I Settlement] (94 percent); Settlement
Agreement § 9.02, In re Yasmin and Yaz (Drospirenone) Mktg., Sales Practices & Prods.
Liab. Litig., No. 3:09-md-2100 (S.D. Ill. Mar. 15 , 2013) [hereinafter Yaz Gallbladder
Settlement] (90 percent); Settlement Agreement § 11.1, In re Vioxx Prods. Liab. Litig., No.
05-md-1657 (E.D. La. Nov. 9, 2007) [hereinafter Vioxx Settlement] (85 percent).
17. See, e.g., ATE Master Settlement Agreement § 3.02, In re Yasmin and Yaz
(Dropirenone) Mktg., Sales Practices Prod. Liab. Litig., No. 09-md-2100 (S.D. Ill. Aug. 3,
2015) [hereinafter Yaz ATE Settlement] (97.5 percent overall, 96 percent death and severe
injury, 100 percent scheduled for trial); Master Settlement Agreement § 5.02, In re Actos
(Pioglitazone) Prods. Liab. Litig., No. 11-md-2299 (W.D. La. Apr. 28, 2015) [hereinafter
Actos Settlement] (95 percent overall, 95 percent death, 95 percent cystectomy, 95 percent
under 60 years old, 95 percent used more than 12 months); Master Settlement Agreement
§ 10.02, In re NuvaRing Prods. Liab., No. 08-MD-1964 (E.D. Mo. Feb. 7, 2014) [hereinafter
NuvaRing Settlement] (95 percent overall, 95 percent death, 95 percent ATE, 95 percent
VTE, 95 percent recent injury, 95 percent timely filed); Vioxx Settlement, supra note 16,
§ 11.1.5 (all of the PSC’s clients); Second MDL Program Term Sheet, § 1.B, In re Propulsid
Prods. Liab. Litig., No. 00-md-1355 (E.D. La. Dec. 15, 2005) [hereinafter Propulsid II
Settlement] (90 percent wrongful death, 95 percent other, 100 percent Achord); MDL-1355
Term Sheet § 1.B, In re Propulsid Prod. Liab. Litig., No. 00-md-1355 (E.D. La. Apr. 30,
2004) [hereinafter Propulsid I Settlement] (85 percent of wrongful death actions and 75
percent of the remaining claims).
18. Class Action Settlement Agreement (as Amended) § 16.1, In re NFL Players’
Concussion Injury Litig., No. 12-md-2323 (E.D. Pa. Feb. 13, 2015) [hereinafter NFL
Concussion Settlement].
19. See, e.g., Vioxx Settlement, supra note 16, § 11.1.5.
20. See, e.g., Fosamax Settlement, supra note 15, § 11.B; Master Settlement Agreement
§ IV.H, In re Am. Med. Sys., Inc. Pelvic Repair Sys. Prods. Liab. Litig., No. 12-md-2325
(S.D. W. Va. June 14, 2013) [hereinafter AMS Settlement].
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money on the table in the first place.21 In other words, the defendant may
pay a peace premium, which benefits claimants as well as the defendant.22
But a walk-away threshold also creates opportunities for individuals or
groups of claimants to strategically hold out. Even where a settlement
requires less than 100 percent participation, a small, coordinated group of
claimants (perhaps sharing the same lawyer) can hold the deal hostage by
threatening to trigger the walk-away provision unless paid off.23
Walk-away provisions guarantee the defendant at least a certain degree of
closure, but they are not, by themselves, bad for individual claimants.24
Walk-away provisions may actually give individual claimants more
leverage if they can threaten to hold up the settlement. But, these strategic
dynamics create the need for some sort of cramdown mechanism to prevent
holdouts from wrecking the deal.25 In other words, by guaranteeing the
defendant a second look, the walk-away provision pressures the lawyers
who negotiate the settlement (and will only get paid if it’s consummated) to
find other tools—like the ones discussed below—to ensure that enough
claimants participate.
One creative variation aimed at addressing these strategic concerns is the
sealed walk-away threshold. In the BP oil spill settlement, for example, the
PSC and defendant negotiated a walk-away threshold. But instead of
specifying the required percentage in the settlement agreement, they filed it
under seal with the MDL judge.26 Keeping the precise threshold secret
made it harder for any strategic player to coordinate a holdout bloc; he
could not know for sure whether he had amassed enough willing opt-outs to
credibly threaten the deal.27 By frustrating strategic holdouts, a sealed
walk-away threshold may give the defendant some protection from adverse
selection without as much need for other cramdown mechanisms.
B. Case-Census Provisions
Case-census provisions also help define the defendant’s exposure. In
many MDL settlements, the defendant and PSC agree to jointly petition the
MDL judge (often in cooperation with state judges managing parallel
consolidations in state court) to order all lawyers with cases in the MDL to

21. Samuel Issacharoff & D. Theodore Rave, The BP Oil Spill Settlement and the
Paradox of Public Litigation, 74 LA. L. REV. 397, 418–19 (2014).
22. See Rave, supra note 1, at 1193–97.
23. Id. at 1200.
24. But cf. Erichson, supra note 7, at 1008–13 (endorsing lower thresholds, but arguing
that walk-away provisions approaching 100 percent place coercive pressure on claimants).
25. See, e.g., Charles Silver & Lynn A. Baker, Mass Lawsuits and the Aggregate
Settlement Rule, 32 WAKE FOREST L. REV. 733, 767–68 (1997).
26. Deepwater Horizon Economic and Property Damages Settlement Agreement as
Amended on May 2, 2012, § 21.3.6, In re Oil Spill by the Oil Rig “Deepwater Horizon” in
the Gulf of Mex., on Apr. 20, 2010, No. 10-md-02179 (E.D. La. May 3, 2012) [hereinafter
BP Settlement].
27. Issacharoff & Rave, supra note 21, at 419.
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register with the settlement administrator all claims in which they have a
financial interest—whether filed or unfiled.28
Case-census provisions help define the universe of claims over which the
parties are negotiating.29 The information revealed can be used to set the
denominator for a walk-away provision.30 But the more important part of a
case-census provision is its ability to expose the existence of unfiled claims.
It flushes wait-and-see claimants out into the open, so lawyers cannot keep
a stable of unfiled claims out of the settlement and later spring them on a
defendant that thinks it has purchased peace. Requiring lawyers to register
every claim in which they have a financial interest—not just the ones where
they are counsel of record—also reveals information about referral
networks on the plaintiffs’ side so the parties can identify the major
aggregators.
In conjunction with case-census provisions, MDL settlements often limit
eligibility for payments to claimants who had retained a lawyer as of the
settlement’s execution date.31 In effect, these terms use retaining a
lawyer—instead of filing a lawsuit—as a proxy for how serious a threat the
claimant poses. Doing so captures the wait-and-see plaintiffs that the
defendant wants in the settlement while avoiding the “Field of Dreams”
problem: if you build a mass settlement, claimants who never would have
sued will come out of the woodwork to settle.32
Although some have characterized case-census provisions as terms that
benefit defendants by providing closure,33 they are not inherently coercive
and do little to limit claimant choice. They only require claimants who
have remained anonymous to identify themselves. That information
facilitates the transaction. Designing a comprehensive settlement is easier
when the universe of claims—and thus the scope of the defendant’s
exposure—is known than when the parties must account for potential
claimants who may come out of the woodwork once the settlement is
announced or stay in the woodwork and bring future claims outside the
settlement.

28. See, e.g., Yaz ATE Settlement, supra note 17, § 1.02; Actos Settlement, supra note
17, § 1.02; DePuy II Settlement, supra note 16, § 3.2.1; NuvaRing Settlement, supra note
17, § 1.5; DePuy I Settlement, supra note 16, § 3.2.1; Vioxx Settlement, supra note 16,
§ 1.1.
29. Actos Settlement, supra note 17, § 1.01 (“The purposes of the registration
requirements . . . are to allow the Parties and the Courts to identify the filed and unfiled cases
and claims connected to ACTOS Products, to create a joint database of such cases and
claims which will help the MDL Court and the Illinois and California Coordinated Courts
cooperatively manage this litigation, and to assist the Parties with effectuating the provisions
of this Agreement.”).
30. See Burch, supra note 7, at 90–91.
31. See, e.g., Yaz ATE Settlement, supra note 17, § 2.02; NuvaRing Settlement, supra
note 17, § 1.04; Yaz Gallbladder Settlement, supra note 16, § 1.05; see also Actos
Settlement, supra note 17, § 2.04(A) (three-day grace period).
32. RICHARD A. NAGAREDA, MASS TORTS IN A WORLD OF SETTLEMENT 147 (2007).
33. Burch, supra note 7, at 90–91; Burch & Williams, supra note 7, at 48.
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II. TERMS THAT INCREASE THE VALUE
OF PARTICIPATING IN THE SETTLEMENT
A mass settlement will deliver more closure if it makes participating
more attractive to claimants than continuing to litigate. One way to do that
is to increase the value of participation.
A. More Money
The simplest way to get more claimants to settle is for the defendant to
offer more money. Claimants, unsurprisingly, like this particular closure
strategy. Defendants, by contrast, would rather keep the money and may
worry about increasing incentives for strategic action.
Defendants might be perfectly happy to pay real money to settle strong
claims. Defendants have reputations to maintain and may see value in
putting a stop to the negative publicity, drag on stock prices, and unwanted
regulatory scrutiny that often accompanies mass litigation.34 But they do
not want to pay real money to strategic players who funnel weak claims into
the settlement or threaten to hold up a deal. Given their informational
disadvantage relative to claimants and their lawyers, defendants may have a
hard time differentiating between genuine and strategic players. And the
more money the defendant makes available in the settlement, the more the
other side stands to gain from strategic action. As a result, simply
sweetening the pot may not always buy defendants the peace they desire.
And, of course, defendants may prefer other, more coercive closure
provisions when those bring peace at a lower cost.
Recent examples of defendants seeking to purchase closure through
generous payments include the BP oil spill and Volkswagen diesel
emissions settlements. To take just one aspect of the BP settlement, the
seafood compensation program paid claimants several times as much as the
voluntary compensation program that BP set up after the spill, totaling
almost five times the annual revenue of the entire Gulf seafood industry.35
In the Volkswagen settlements, the company agreed to buy back cars at
their pre-emissions-scandal value on top of substantial restitution
payments.36 Of course, an outsider cannot know how much the desire for
closure factored into these settlements or gauge the effects of seemingly
generous payments against the counterfactual where the defendant offered
less. While more money can buy more closure, it is difficult to measure
when or how much.
B. Participation Bonuses
Participation bonuses are a more tailored way to increase the value of
participating in the settlement. They work by increasing the total settlement
34. See Rave, supra note 1, at 1195.
35. See Issacharoff & Rave, supra note 21, at 405–06, 410–11.
36. Consumer Class Action Settlement Agreement and Release (Amended), § 4, In re
Volkswagen “Clean Diesel” Mktg., Sales Practices and Prods. Liab. Litig., No. 15-md-2672
(N.D. Cal. July 26, 2016) [hereinafter Volkswagen Settlement].
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fund in escalating amounts as participation approaches 100 percent. In the
Propulsid settlement, for example, the defendant agreed to pay a base
amount of $69.5 million as long as 85 percent of wrongful-death claimants
opted in, but the defendant would add on escalating payments for each
additional percentage point of participation: $700,000 for each point
between 86 percent and 90 percent, $900,000 for each point between 91
percent and 95 percent, and $1.7 million for each point between 96 percent
and 100 percent.37 The World Trade Center disaster site settlement had a
similar structure: the defendants would pay $625 million if 95 percent of
claimants opted in, escalating up to $712.5 million if 100 percent opted in.38
In other words, to get the last 5 percent to sign on, the defendant was
willing to pay more than twice as much per claimant as for the first 95
percent.39
Participation bonuses like these reflect the defendant’s willingness to pay
a premium for peace, and they benefit claimants who can deliver it.40
Although the defendant is paying more money for the last claim than for
earlier claims, the extra money does not go to the last claimant. Instead, it
goes into the total fund to be allocated according to whatever formula is in
the settlement agreement. This works out well for claimants, as they can
capture the peace premium if enough of them opt in, but they still get paid
something if they cannot deliver total peace; the deal does not evaporate
because a handful reject it. In this sense, participation bonuses are the
flipside of terms that allow the defendant to reduce the settlement amount if
the walk-away threshold is not met instead of blowing up the whole deal.41
Participation bonuses, however, give claimants more advance certainty
because they do not give the defendant the option to go nuclear instead of
simply withholding a premium.
Because the whole deal’s viability is not at stake, participation bonuses
present less incentive and opportunity for strategic players to hold out. But
because money will be left on the table if some claimants refuse to
participate, lawyers may still be tempted to pressure clients to opt in.

37. Propulsid I Settlement, supra note 17, § 3.B. The second Propulsid settlement had a
similar structure. Neither settlement’s participation-bonus feature actually resulted in
additional compensation for claimants because too few qualified for payments, and the
unexhausted fund reverted to the defendant. See Burch, supra note 7, at 89–90. But the
Propulsid structure still illustrates how participation bonuses can function.
38. World Trade Center Litigation Settlement Process Agreement, as Amended, §§ II.A,
IV, VI.E (Mar. 11, 2010), http://www.nysd.uscourts.gov/cases/show.php?db=911&id=540
[https://perma.cc/7AUV-CZ39]. The World Trade Center Disaster Site Litigation was not
technically an MDL, but it was a similarly structured mass consolidation of all cases arising
out of the 9/11 terrorists attacks.
39. Rave, supra note 1, at 1184–85.
40. The Actos settlement also included participation bonuses, but they were not
escalating like Propulsid or WTC, so they less clearly reflect a peace premium. Actos
Settlement, supra note 17, § 10.01(A).
41. See supra note 20 and accompanying text.
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III. TERMS THAT IMPAIR THE LITIGATION VALUE OF CLAIMS
OUTSIDE THE SETTLEMENT
Boosting the benefits of participation is not the only way to make
settlement look more attractive than litigation. The dealmakers may also
include terms that make continued litigation harder. These terms do more
than take away benefits of aggregation (e.g., scale economies, shared
resources, and risk pooling) and actually impair the litigation value of
claims outside of the settlement.
A. Lone Pine Orders
Lone Pine orders are not actually settlement terms, though the settling
parties may agree to jointly petition the MDL judge for one after the
settlement is consummated. Lone Pine orders are case-management orders
that require nonsettling plaintiffs in the MDL to come forward with certain
evidence (typically medical or expert evidence of injury or causation) by a
certain deadline or face summary judgment.42 In other words, nonsettling
plaintiffs have to “put up or shut up.”
Although they are sometimes described as a “post-settlement mop-up
procedure,”43 Lone Pine orders do not require anything of claimants that
they would not ultimately have to produce at trial. So they do not, in that
sense, significantly impair the litigation value of nonsettling claims. They
do, however, accelerate the time frame and force claimants’ lawyers to
invest in these cases right away or abandon them. In that sense,
participating in a global settlement may look relatively more attractive.
B. Most-Favored-Nation Clauses
Most-favored-nation clauses are agreements that, if the defendant
subsequently settles on more favorable terms with any claimant outside the
global settlement, it will retroactively increase payments to participating
claimants to match. While it might look like these terms increase the value
of participating and thus belong in the previous category, that is not their
primary function. A most-favored-nation clause is designed to never be
triggered. Instead it signals to claimants that they will not get a better deal
outside of the global settlement, because it would cost the defendant too
much to top up all of the participating claimants.44 The defendant is
essentially precommitting to fight nonparticipating claimants tooth and nail.

42. Lone Pine Order, BLACK’S LAW DICTIONARY (10th ed. 2014); see, e.g., Lore v. Lone
Pine Corp., No. L-33606-85, 1986 WL 637507 (N.J. Super. Ct. Law Div. Nov. 18, 1986);
Jeremy T. Grabill, Judicial Review of Private Mass Tort Settlements, 42 SETON HALL L. REV.
123, 155 (2012).
43. Burch, supra note 7, at 100 (quoting PSC’s Memorandum of Points and Authorities
in Opposition to Defendant Merck’s Motion for Entry of Lone Pine Order at 7, In re
Fosamax Prods. Liab. Litig., No. 06-md-1789 (S.D.N.Y. Oct. 29, 2012)).
44. Richard A. Nagareda, The Preexistence Principle and the Structure of the Class
Action, 103 COLUM. L. REV. 149, 218 (2003).
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Most-favored-nation clauses have been used in several class action
settlements within MDLs.45 But they may be less practical in nonclass
aggregate settlements (particularly mass torts), where the details and
strength of claims may vary significantly. Because a most-favored-nation
clause is triggered when the defendant settles on more favorable terms with
a nonparticipating claimant, there must be some way to determine whether
the terms were or were not more favorable. And that can be difficult if the
claimants are differently situated (i.e., the nonparticipating claimant might
get more money for more severe injuries). Further, this is something that
the parties would be likely to fight about postsettlement, undermining the
point of a closure provision to begin with. So some mass tort settlements,
like those offering relatively uniform compensation on a defined grid, may
be amenable to most-favored-nation clauses, while others, like those that
enlist a settlement administrator to determine individualized payments, may
not.
When they are used, most-favored-nation clauses provide a powerful
incentive for claimants to participate in the global settlement, unless they
are willing to take their cases to trial.
C. Trust Secured by All of the Defendant’s Assets
An even stronger way to impair the litigation value of claims outside the
settlement is to use the settlement to effectively make them junior creditors
to participating claimants. The parties in the Sulzer hip case attempted to
employ this strategy by creating a trust to pay claims in a comprehensive
settlement program.46 The trust was funded with the defendant’s insurance
proceeds, cash, and much of its future income stream, and it was secured by
a lien on all of Sulzer’s assets—although those assets could be sold free and
clear of the lien for business purposes, so long as the proceeds did not go to
pay nonparticipating claimants.47 This trust-and-lien structure severely
impaired the litigation value of claims outside the settlement. Even if a
nonparticipating claimant won his trial and appeal, he could not collect on
any of Sulzer’s assets until all participating claimants had been paid through
the settlement program—a process expected to take six years, with no
guarantee that anything would be left over.48
The Sulzer hip settlement was done as a class action, but there is no
reason that MDL dealmakers could not adopt a similar trust-and-lien
structure for a nonclass aggregate settlement that would take effect once
some threshold number of claimants opted in. If they did, there would be
no judicial fairness review under Rule 23(e) to derail the deal, as the courts

45. See, e.g., In re Vitamins Antitrust Class Actions, 215 F.3d 26 (D.C. Cir. 2000);
Brown v. Esmor Corr. Servs., Inc., No. Civ. 98-1282DRD, 2005 WL 1917869, at *10
(D.N.J. Aug. 10, 2005); see also 4 WILLIAM B. RUBENSTEIN, NEWBERG ON CLASS ACTIONS
§ 13:5 (5th ed. 2014).
46. Nagareda, supra note 44, at 209–11.
47. Id.
48. Id. at 209–10 (quoting Sulzer’s lawyer, Richard Scruggs).
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effectively did in the Sulzer case.49 Though perhaps there are limits to how
far the defendant and PSC can go in using this sort of trust-and-lien
structure in a nonclass settlement to foist an unattractive deal on claimants.
A nonclass aggregate settlement would require initial buy-in from enough
claimants (many of whom will have separate representation in the MDL) to
make it look like the deal will succeed before it would pose a credible threat
to claimants who would rather not participate. In a class action, by contrast,
all of the claimants are presumptively in the settlement, unless they have the
guts to opt out in the hopes that enough other claimants will follow them to
destroy the deal. But even in a nonclass aggregate settlement, the trust-andlien structure could be a powerful tool to cramdown a settlement with buyin from the majority over the objection of a minority of claimants who
believe they are being underpaid.
IV. TERMS THAT CHANGE
THE DEFAULT RULE TO PARTICIPATION
Another way to increase closure in an MDL settlement is to shift the
default rule from nonparticipation to participation. This is most easily and
legitimately achieved through a class action settlement, but parties in MDLs
have experimented with shifting the default rule contractually as well.
A. Class Action Settlement
The ultimate closure mechanism would be to structure the settlement as a
mandatory class action under Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 23(b)(1) or
(b)(2). But in Ortiz v. Fibreboard Corp.50 and Wal-Mart Stores, Inc. v.
Dukes,51 the U.S. Supreme Court has limited mandatory class actions to a
narrow set of circumstances.
Rule 23(b)(3) opt-out class actions are also limited to situations where
the claims are similar enough to form a cohesive class and thus unavailable
in many MDLs.52 But class action settlements in MDLs are by no means
rare. To name just a few high-profile examples, the MDLs in the BP oil
spill, NFL concussion, and Volkswagen diesel emissions litigations were all
resolved through class-action settlements.53
A class action settlement increases closure by shifting from an opt-in
model to an opt-out model. Instead of individual claimants needing to
affirmatively sign on to the settlement, all claimants within the class
49. The parties renegotiated the settlement to eliminate the trust-and-lien structure and
pay claimants more after the Sixth Circuit expressed “serious doubts” about the district
court’s approval of the settlement under Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 23(e). See In re
Inter-op Hip Prosthesis Prods. Liab. Litig., No. 01-4039, 2001 WL 1774017 (6th Cir. Oct.
29, 2001), vacated in part, No. 01-4039, 2001 WL 34110370 (6th Cir. 2001); Nagareda,
supra note 44, at 215–16.
50. 527 U.S. 815 (1999).
51. 564 U.S. 338 (2011).
52. See, e.g., Amchem Prods., Inc. v. Windsor, 521 U.S. 591, 623 (1997).
53. Volkswagen Settlement, supra note 36; NFL Concussion Settlement, supra note 18;
BP Settlement, supra note 26.
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definition are automatically bound by the settlement unless they opt out.
Default rules are “sticky,” the theory goes, so changing the default from
nonparticipation to participation will inevitably sweep in more claimants.54
The default rule matters tremendously in small-claims class actions,
where most class member pay little attention to their claims. But it matters
less to claimants who have gone through the trouble of hiring a lawyer and
filing a lawsuit that was consolidated in the MDL. Particularly in mass tort
MDLs, where claims are often substantial, plaintiffs with cases pending are
going to make a conscious decision to participate or not in the settlement,
no matter what the default rule is.
Where a class action settlement can offer additional closure is in its
ability to reach potential claimants who have not yet filed suit. If these
claimants can be properly included in the class definition, the class action
settlement can force them to decide by a certain date to either opt out of the
settlement or forever forego their right to sue.55 Of course, a class action
settlement requires court approval, and the cases where dealmakers find it
most advantageous to secure closure—to bind exposure-only claimants—
are the very scenarios where courts are most skeptical about its use.56
B. Automatic-Enrollment Provisions
Some enterprising dealmakers have attempted to recreate features of the
class action’s opt-out default rule in nonclass MDL settlements. In the Yaz
gallbladder settlement, for example, the negotiating parties agreed that the
MDL judge would enter case-management orders in all gallbladder-injury
cases pending in the federal MDL that would automatically enroll plaintiffs
in the settlement unless they affirmatively opted out by a certain date.57 If
these plaintiffs did not opt out and did not submit claim packages in the
settlement program, their cases would be dismissed with prejudice.58 The
MDL judge entered the requested orders.59
The scope of the Yaz settlement’s shift to an opt-out model was,
however, significantly more limited than a Rule 23(b)(3) class action
settlement. The automatic-enrollment provision did not apply to claimants
with cases pending in state court, those with unfiled claims, or even all
claims pending in the federal MDL.60 It expressly excluded claimants
54. See Issacharoff & Rave, supra note 21, at 425. See generally CASS R. SUNSTEIN &
RICHARD H. THALER, NUDGE: IMPROVING DECISIONS ABOUT HEALTH, WEALTH, AND
HAPPINESS (2008); Colin Camerer et al., Regulation for Conservatives: Behavioral
Economics and the Case for “Asymmetric Paternalism,” 151 U. PA. L. REV. 1211 (2003).
55. See Issacharoff & Rave, supra note 21, at 421–22.
56. See, e.g., Ortiz v. Fibreboard Corp., 527 U.S. 815 (1999); Amchem Prods., 521 U.S.
at 623; Stephenson v. Dow Chem. Co., 273 F.3d 249 (2d Cir. 2001). But see In re NFL
Players’ Concussion Injury Litig., 307 F.R.D. 351 (E.D. Pa. 2015).
57. Yaz Gallbladder Settlement, supra note 16, §§ 1.01(A), 6.01(A).
58. Id. § 6.01(A).
59. Order No. 60: Case Management (Settlement Agreement and Deadlines—
Gallbladder Injuries) at 2–4, In re Yasmin and Yaz (Drospirenone) Mktg., Sales Practice. &
Prod. Liab. Litig., No. 3:09-md-2100 (S.D. Ill. Mar. 19, 2013) [hereinafter Yaz Case
Management Order].
60. Id. at 4.
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alleging more serious injuries alongside their gallbladder claims.61 All of
those claimants were eligible to participate in the settlement, but they would
have to affirmatively opt in.
This sort of automatic-enrollment provision required the cooperation of
the MDL judge, and it is not clear that judges have this power. The court
went along with the plan in Yaz, where the claims for gallbladder injury
were modest and fairly uniform.62 And there is a plausible argument that
shifting the default rule on such claims might be justified as an attempt to
reduce transaction costs for modest claims pending in the federal MDL.
The automatic-enrollment program excluded higher-value claims and
provided a robust form of notice—entry on the individual dockets for
represented parties with currently pending federal cases.63 But it is
unquestionably an aggressive use of the MDL judge’s case-management
power to change the default rule without Rule 23’s formal protections.
Claimants’ lawyers might also try to shift the default rule without any
judicial participation. In the Propulsid settlement, for example, the
(presumably negotiated) form letter that the PSC designed for participating
lawyers to send their clients said that the lawyers would be opting all of
their clients into the settlement unless they returned an enclosed opt-out
form.64 The Propulsid settlement included more substantial and less
uniform claims than the Yaz gallbladder settlement, but the letter
acknowledged that most claimants would receive no compensation under
the settlement.65 Such unilateral action by the lawyers would seem to run
afoul of the legal ethical rules governing settlement.66
V. TERMS THAT PREVENT LAWYERS FROM CHERRY-PICKING
Because a class action gives a single lawyer monopoly control over the
class members’ claims, the defendant need only negotiate with one
counterparty to craft a comprehensive settlement.67
Without that
monopoly, MDL defendants must deal with hordes of claimants either
individually or through their bargaining agents. Defendants can—and do—
deal with the court-appointed PSC as a counterparty in settlement
61. Id.
62. Yaz Gall Bladder Settlement, supra note 16, § 2.05.
63. Yaz Case Management Order, supra note 59.
64. Form Letter Claims on Behalf of Decedents at 3, In re Propulsid Prods. Liab. Litig.,
No. 00-md-1355 (E.D. La. Apr. 30, 2004) [hereinafter Propulsid Form Letter], http://
www.laed.uscourts.gov/case-information/mdl-mass-class-action/propulsid (“WE WILL BE
OPTING YOUR CLAIM INTO THE SETTLEMENT PROGRAM UNLESS YOU
RETURN TO US, VIA CERTIFIED MAIL, RETURN RECEIPT, AN OPT OUT FORM.
THE OPT OUT FORM IS ENCLOSED. IT SHOULD ONLY BE RETURNED TO US IN
THE EVENT YOU DO NOT DESIRE TO PARTICIPATE IN THE SETTLEMENT
PROGRAM. YOU MUST RETURN THE OPT OUT FORM BY AUGUST 15, 2004 OR
ELSE YOUR CLAIM WILL BE INCLUDED IN THE SETTLEMENT PROGRAM.”)
[https://perma.cc/NVP4-ZHVY].
65. Id.
66. See MODEL RULES OF PROF’L CONDUCT r. 1.2(a) (AM. BAR ASS’N 2016) (“A lawyer
shall abide by a client’s decision whether to settle a matter.”); id. r. 1.4 (communications).
67. See Nagareda, supra note 44, at 164.
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negotiations.68 But the PSC does not control all of the claims like a class
action lawyer. While the PSC can negotiate the structure of a global
settlement, they still need buy-in from the claimants and their individual
lawyers.
The network of client solicitation and referral arrangements that exists on
the plaintiffs’ side in mass litigation tends to consolidate groups of
claimants in the hands of major aggregators.69 Given the inevitability of
this sort of informal aggregation, MDL dealmakers in the early 2000s hit on
an innovation where defendants do deals with the lawyers instead of with
the claimants directly.70 These deals make each lawyer’s inventory the unit
of negotiation and typically take the form of a global offer to all of the
lawyers in the MDL to settle their case inventories.
But dealing with lawyers, inventory by inventory instead of claim by
claim, creates opportunities for cherry-picking. Knowing more than the
defendant about the strength of claims in their inventories, the lawyers will
predictably funnel the weakest claims into the settlement and use the threat
of taking the strongest claims to trial to hold out for more—exactly the type
of adverse selection that the defendant wants (and may be willing to pay) to
avoid. This is, after all, why defendants insist on terms like walk-away
provisions. So the defendant and PSC try to design these deals so that a
lawyer who wants to settle any claims in the global settlement must agree to
settle all of the claims in his or her inventory.71 There are several strategies
by which dealmakers try to limit lawyer cherry-picking.
A. Voting
One way for a lawyer to precommit not to engage in cherry-picking is to
have his clients agree in advance to be bound by a vote among themselves
on whether to accept a group settlement offer.72 Claimants might find this
arrangement advantageous because it allows their lawyer to offer to settle
their claims as a single package in exchange for a peace premium.73
Binding claimants to a vote disables would-be holdouts, thereby
maximizing the group’s collective negotiating position. And, although
individual claimants can be bound over their objection, the voting
mechanism does not shift leverage toward the defendant the way that terms
68. In this sense, the PSC shares some of the state-conferred monopolistic features of
class counsel. See Samuel Issacharoff, The Governance Problem in Aggregate Litigation, 81
FORDHAM L. REV. 3165, 3168 (2013).
69. See Howard M. Erichson, Informal Aggregation:
Procedural and Ethical
Implications of Coordination Among Counsel in Related Lawsuits, 50 DUKE L.J. 381, 387
(2000); Deborah R. Hensler & Mark A. Peterson, Understanding Mass Personal Injury
Litigation: A Socio-Legal Analysis, 59 BROOK. L. REV. 961, 963 (1993); Judith Resnik,
From “Cases” to “Litigation,” 54 LAW & CONTEMP. PROBS. 5, 28–35 (1991). Informal
aggregation has been going on for a long time. See Samuel Issacharoff & John Fabian Witt,
The Inevitability of Aggregate Settlement: An Institutional Account of American Tort Law,
57 VAND. L. REV. 1571, 1596 (2004).
70. See Burch, supra note 7, at 90–91.
71. See id. at 127.
72. See, e.g., Tax Auth., Inc. v. Jackson Hewitt, Inc., 898 A.2d 512, 515 (N.J. 2006).
73. See, e.g., Rave, supra note 1, at 1187; Silver & Baker, supra note 25, at 751.
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impairing the litigation value of claims outside the settlement do.74
Because claimants can still participate in the settlement if they are outvoted,
those opposed to the deal can safely vote against it; they need not take the
much bigger risk of opting out and litigating alone.75 This makes it difficult
for the defendant to lowball the group. But, like any majoritarian process, it
creates the risk that claimants in the minority (especially those with
atypically strong claims) can be exploited, so a fair allocation process is
critical to making voting work.76
Although the ALI’s Principles of the Law of Aggregate Litigation
endorsed a voting mechanism along these lines, no state has yet modified its
ethics rules to permit it.77 The voting arrangement is inconsistent with
prevailing interpretations of the aggregate settlement rule, and there are
concerns about how genuine clients’ advance consent can be.78 The debate
is well ventilated.79 I will not rehash it here, except to say that voting can
prevent lawyer cherry-picking without many of the undesirable features of
other closure provisions that dealmakers use in MDL settlements.
B. Lawyer-Recommendation Provisions
Another way that dealmakers try to limit cherry-picking is by requiring
lawyers who enroll claimants to agree to recommend the settlement to all
clients in their inventories (typically both those who have filed lawsuits and
those who have signed retainer agreements but not yet filed). In other
words, the lawyer cannot funnel only weak claims into the settlement,
because, in order for any client to participate, the lawyer must become a
party to the settlement and agree to recommend it to all clients.
Lawyer-recommendation provisions take many forms. The Propulsid
settlement, the original Vioxx settlement, and the AMS mesh products
74. Rave, supra note 1, at 1248–49.
75. Id.
76. Id. at 1249–50.
77. PRINCIPLES OF THE LAW OF AGGREGATE LITIGATION § 3.17 (AM. LAW INST. 2010);
see Carol A. Needham, Advance Consent to Aggregate Settlements: Reflections on
Attorneys’ Fiduciary Obligations and Professional Responsibility Duties, 44 LOY. U. CHI.
L.J. 511, 515 (2012) (noting that no state has adopted the ALI voting mechanism).
78. See Tax Auth., Inc. v. Jackson Hewitt, Inc., 898 A.2d 512, 521, 523 (N.J. 2006);
Erichson & Zipursky, supra note 7, at 298–311; Nancy J. Moore, The Case Against
Changing the Aggregate Settlement Rule in Mass Tort Lawsuits, 41 S. TEX. L. REV. 149,
180–81 (1999).
79. Compare Howard M. Erichson, Beyond the Class Action: Lawyer Loyalty and
Client Autonomy in Non-Class Collective Representation, 2003 U. CHI. LEGAL F. 519, 570–
71, Erichson & Zipursky, supra note 7, Nancy J. Moore, The Absence of Legal Ethics in the
ALI’s Principles of the Law of Aggregate Litigation: A Missed Opportunity—And More, 79
GEO. WASH. L. REV. 717, 718 (2011), Nancy J. Moore, The American Law Institute’s Draft
Proposal to Bypass the Aggregate Settlement Rule: Do Mass Tort Clients Need (or Want)
Group Decisionmaking?, 57 DEPAUL L. REV. 395, 401 (2008), Moore, supra note 78, and
Thomas D. Morgan, Client Representation vs. Case Administration: The ALI Looks at Legal
Ethics Issues in Aggregate Settlements, 79 GEO. WASH. L. REV. 734, 734 (2011), with Rave,
supra note 1, Charles Silver, Ethics and Innovation, 79 GEO. WASH. L. REV. 754, 757
(2011), Charles Silver & Lynn Baker, I Cut, You Choose: The Role of Plaintiffs’ Counsel in
Allocating Settlement Proceeds, 84 VA. L. REV. 1465, 1469 (1998), and Silver & Baker,
supra note 25.

2192

FORDHAM LAW REVIEW

[Vol. 85

settlement included strong forms of lawyer-recommendation provisions,
which simply required any participating lawyer to recommend the
settlements to all of his or her clients.80 The lawyer must be either all in as
to his or her inventory or all out. This strong provision can put a lawyer
who believes the settlement is a good deal for some clients, but a bad deal
for others, in an ethical pickle.81 The lawyer cannot loyally serve both sets
of clients simultaneously by being all in or all out.
Accordingly, many lawyer-recommendation provisions include an ethical
out—conditioning the recommendation on the lawyer’s independent
professional judgment. The details matter for these ethical outs. Some, like
the amended Vioxx settlement, appear to be little more than window
dressing. Participating lawyers had to agree that they had exercised their
“independent judgment in the best interests of each client individually” and,
having done so, that they would recommend participation to 100 percent of
their clients.82 This does not present a problem where the lawyer truly
believes that the settlement is in the best interest of each and every client.
But if the lawyer believes that some, but not all, clients would do better
litigating alone, the lawyer is placed in an untenable situation.83 He can
either not participate and violate the duty to bring all settlement offers to
clients or participate and give bad advice to some clients.
Other MDL settlements appear to offer lawyers a real ethical out. The
DePuy ASR settlement, for example, stressed that the ultimate decision
whether to enroll “rests with each individual” claimant.84 Participating
lawyers had to agree that “subject to the exercise of their independent
professional judgment as to the circumstances of individual clients, they
will endorse enrollment in [the settlement] to clients covered by this
Agreement” and that they would use their “best efforts” to obtain all of the
required documentation “from all of their clients who elect to enroll.”85
And the Yaz ATE settlement required lawyers to agree that “counsel for
each Claimant shall individually evaluate their client’s participation in this
Program, and shall recommend participation in the Program to all clients
for whom they believe participation is appropriate.”86
Although scholars sometimes lump all of these lawyer-recommendation
provisions together as terms that reduce client choice,87 they differ
significantly. A lawyer participating in the DePuy settlement would not
80. AMS Settlement, supra note 20, § IV.B; Vioxx Settlement, supra note 16, § 1.2.8.1;
Propulsid II Settlement, supra note 17, § 3.D; Propulsid I Settlement, supra note 17, § 3.D.
81. See Erichson & Zipursky, supra note 7, at 283–84.
82. Amendment to Settlement Agreement § 1.2.2, In re Vioxx Prods. Liab. Litig., No.
05-md-1657 (E.D. La. Jan. 17, 2008).
83. See Conn. Bar Ass’n, Informal Op. 08-01 (2008) (explaining the obligations of
plaintiffs’ counsel under a particular aggregate settlement agreement); Erichson, supra note
7, at 1004. But see Lynn A. Baker, Mass Torts and the Pursuit of Ethical Finality, 85
FORDHAM L. REV. 1943, 1952–57 (2017) (arguing that a lawyer could not participate as to
any clients).
84. DePuy I Settlement, supra note 16, § 17.2.5.
85. Id. § 17.2.8.
86. Yaz ATE Settlement, supra note 17, § 1.02(D).
87. Burch, supra note 7, at 90–91; Burch & Williams, supra note 7, at 59–60.
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face the same ethical conundrum as in the Vioxx settlement if he thought
the settlement was a good deal for some but not all of his clients. And the
Yaz ATE settlement seems to require lawyers to do exactly what ethical
lawyers should do.
Finally, some MDL settlements include terms requiring lawyers on the
PSC to use their “best efforts” to achieve sufficient participation.88
Although these best-efforts provisions are sometimes lumped in with other
lawyer-recommendation provisions,89 they do not operate the same way,
and they do little to prevent lawyer cherry-picking because they apply only
to the PSC, not to the lawyers who are signing up inventories in the
settlement the PSC negotiated. Those lawyers remain free to recommend
the settlement to some clients but not others.
While some lawyer-recommendation provisions may be unobjectionable,
the stronger forms can encourage lawyers to treat their clients as groups, not
as individuals.90 And if the settlement is a good deal for the group as a
whole, the lawyer may be tempted to give bad advice to individual clients
who might do better outside of the settlement if it means that the group can
participate (and the lawyer can get paid).
But even the strongest forms of lawyer-recommendation provisions are
rather weak closure devices standing alone. It is unclear how they could be
enforced without intrusive discovery into the lawyer-client relationship.
Ethical outs give lawyers plenty of wiggle room to steer clients with strong
claims out of the settlement. And dissatisfied clients can ignore the
lawyer’s (perhaps half-hearted) recommendation, while the lawyer says,
“Well, I tried.” For these reasons, lawyer-recommendation provisions are
often combined with other terms, such as inventory-expulsion or lawyerwithdrawal provisions, to give them teeth.
C. Inventory-Expulsion Provisions
Inventory-expulsion provisions put some teeth in lawyerrecommendation provisions and help to enforce the in-for-a-penny-in-for-apound nature of the deal between the defendant and the lawyers. Like other
closure provisions, their forms can vary.
Some impose a flat ban: participating lawyers “shall not be permitted to
enroll less than 100% of the MDL plaintiffs they represent.”91 These
inventory-expulsion provisions work by tying lawyers’ financial incentives
to their ability to deliver their entire inventories. If even one client does not
want to participate, the lawyer risks having his entire inventory shut out of
the deal, meaning that he cannot get paid for enrolling any claimants in the
settlement. This creates a temptation for the lawyer to pressure the
88. Yaz ATE Settlement, supra note 17, § 3.01; Actos Settlement, supra note 17, § 5.01;
NuvaRing Settlement, supra note 17, § 10.01; Yaz Gallbladder Settlement, supra note 16,
§ 9.01.
89. Burch, supra note 7, at 91; Burch & Williams, supra note 7, at 59–60.
90. See, e.g., Burch, supra note 7, at 104.
91. Propulsid II Settlement, supra note 17, § 3.D; Propulsid I Settlement, supra note 17,
§ 3.D.
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reluctant client into participating so that the lawyer (and other clients) can
get paid.
Other inventory-expulsion provisions are more nuanced. The Vioxx
settlement gave the defendant an option to expel all or part of a lawyer’s
inventory if the lawyer failed to recommend participation to all of his
clients or attempt to withdraw from representing nonsettling claimants.92
Thus the lawyer’s fate was not tied to a single recalcitrant client, as long as
the lawyer took all necessary steps to try to withdraw from representing that
client.
Further, the DePuy settlement allowed the defendant to expel a
participating lawyer’s inventory if, and only if, the special master appointed
to oversee the settlement found that that lawyer “did not act in good faith”
in connection with the lawyer-recommendation provision, which included a
real ethical out.93 So the defendant could not kick a lawyer’s inventory out
of the deal unilaterally but only upon a neutral party’s finding that the
lawyer acted in bad faith.94
How coercive this is depends on what counts as “good faith,” and the key
provision in the DePuy settlement is that the special master, not the
defendant, will make that determination.95 Would a lawyer be acting in
good faith if he told a client with a good shot of winning at trial to reject the
settlement because he would get more by litigating alone? Or by advising a
client who had nonmonetary reasons for litigating not to settle? The DePuy
settlement’s lawyer-recommendation provision included an ethical out, so
quite probably yes, that would be a good faith reason to recommend that
some clients not participate. But a lawyer would probably not act in good
faith by telling clients with weaker claims to take the settlement and then
using the remaining stronger claims to threaten to trigger the walk-away
threshold unless he got a side payment. Such strategic behavior could
hardly be described as good faith. What about a lawyer who thought that
the settlement offer probably exceeded the expected value of his client’s
claim but thought he could negotiate a larger payment outside of the global
settlement because of the defendant’s desire to end negative publicity? Is
that good faith? Perhaps a zealous advocate should make such a move on
his client’s behalf. But the extra payment that the claimant may be able to
extract is not tied to the individual merit of the claim. Reasonable minds
could differ.
The good faith inventory-expulsion provision in DePuy creates
uncertainty for the lawyer. Advising clients not to opt in to the settlement
puts the lawyer’s entire inventory at risk depending on the special master’s
92. Vioxx Settlement, supra note 16, § 1.2.6.2.
93. DePuy I Settlement, supra note 16, § 17.2.12; see also id. §§ 17.2.8, 17.2.9–.11.
94. Contrary to some suggestions, the DePuy good faith provision does not operate like
a lawyer-withdrawal provision. Cf. Burch, supra note 7, at 103–04. An inventory-expulsion
provision pressures lawyers into enrolling their entire inventories and works only indirectly
on claimants, if the lawyers in turn pressure their clients to settle. A lawyer-withdrawal
provision puts direct pressure on claimants, telling them that if they do not participate, they
will have to find another lawyer.
95. See supra note 93.

2017]

CLOSURE PROVISIONS IN MDL SETTLEMENTS

2195

view of good faith. Therefore, a lawyer might think twice about advising a
client not to settle. Depending on the special master’s interpretation,
however, a good faith provision may actually be well tailored to limit
strategic holdouts and still allow claimants who have atypically strong
claims or genuine problems with the deal to continue to litigate with the
same lawyer.
D. Lawyer-Withdrawal Provisions
Another way to put teeth into a lawyer-recommendation provision is to
pair it with a lawyer-withdrawal provision.
These terms require
participating lawyers to withdraw from representing any client who does
not opt in to the settlement.
Lawyer-withdrawal provisions reduce the temptation for lawyers to
cherry-pick by half-heartedly recommending the settlement to clients with
strong claims because the lawyer cannot continue to represent those clients
in litigation. These provisions are lower stakes than inventory-expulsion
provisions for participating lawyers because the lawyer can still participate
in the deal even if some clients do not want to. Therefore, the pressure on
the lawyer to sign up every client is correspondingly lessened. But lawyerwithdrawal provisions decouple the lawyer’s financial interests from client
choice. The only way the lawyer can collect a full contingency fee is for
the client to opt in to the settlement. The lawyer’s advice may thus be
skewed toward participation.
Like lawyer-recommendation provisions, the details of lawyerwithdrawal provisions matter. Some settlements include strong and
sophisticated lawyer-withdrawal provisions. The Vioxx settlement, for
example, required participating lawyers to not only withdraw from
representing nonsettling clients but also to forgo any financial interest in
any Vioxx-related claim, filed or unfiled.96 This meant that lawyers could
not get paid for work already done for nonsettling clients, and they could
not take a referral fee for sending those clients to other lawyers. In other
words, the only way the lawyers could be paid anything for their clients’
claims is if they participated in the settlement.
Other settlements include less sophisticated, weaker lawyer-withdrawal
provisions. The AMS mesh products settlement, for example, required
participating lawyers to withdraw from representing nonsettling clients but
did not require them to forgo any financial interest in those clients’
claims.97 Presumably, the lawyers could take a referral fee for sending
nonsettling clients to other lawyers or seek payment for work already done
on their cases. And the settlement included an ethical out: the lawyers
were only required to withdraw “[t]o the extent permitted by the rules of
professional conduct in any jurisdiction in which the firm may practice.”98
96. Vioxx Settlement, supra note 16, § 1.2.8.2.
97. AMS Settlement, supra note 20, § IV.I.
98. Id. Professor Baker has argued that the Vioxx settlement included a similar ethical
out. Baker, supra note 83, at 1962–65.

2196

FORDHAM LAW REVIEW

[Vol. 85

Finally, the lawyer-withdrawal provision may sometimes be implicit.
The Propusid settlement contained no express lawyer-withdrawal provision,
but participating lawyers interpreted the settlement to allow them to
withdraw from representing nonsettling claimants in order to prevent the
defendant from excluding them under the inventory-expulsion provision.99
Similarly, the Fosamax settlement had no explicit lawyer-withdrawal
provision, but its walk-away provision gave the defendant the option to
terminate the entire deal or proportionally reduce the settlement amount if
less than 100 percent of claimants opted in.100 Several participating
lawyers who could not persuade their entire inventories to sign on withdrew
from representing the nonsettling clients, and the defendant reduced the
settlement amount accordingly.101
While lawyer-withdrawal provisions put less pressure on lawyers to sign
up every client than inventory-expulsion provisions, they put far more
pressure on the individual claimants. In order to reject the global
settlement, a claimant needs to find a new lawyer. I leave for others the
question of whether lawyer-withdrawal provisions are consistent with the
legal ethics rules.102 But permitted or not, having to find a new lawyer is a
big imposition on claimants and—like terms that impair the litigation value
of claims outside the global settlement—raises the cost of not participating
in the deal.103
Exactly how much a lawyer-withdrawal provision raises the cost of not
settling depends on the availability of new counsel willing to represent
nonsettling claimants. In a competitive legal market where new lawyers are
readily available and withdrawing counsel can refer nonsettling clients to
other competent lawyers, the impact on claimant choice is limited.
Claimants might lose their first-choice lawyers, but they retain a realistic
choice between opting into the settlement or continuing to litigate with
another lawyer. If, however, the settlement disrupts the referral market for
existing lawyers familiar with this type of litigation and barriers to entry for
new lawyers are high, then lawyer-withdrawal provisions can make it
difficult for dissatisfied claimants to reject the settlement. This may allow
the defendant and PSC to foist a less attractive deal on claimants.
VI. TERMS THAT ALTER THE MARKET FOR LEGAL SERVICES
In MDLs, and mass litigation more generally, lawyers—not individual
claimants—are the important players. Indeed, this is the premise of
structuring settlements as deals between the defendant and the claimants’
99. Propulsid Form Letter, supra note 64, at 2.
100. See supra note 15.
101. Burch, supra note 7, at 99.
102. Professors Erichson and Zipursky have argued that the lawyer-withdrawal provisions
of the Vioxx settlement violated Model Rules of Professional Conduct 1.2(a) (on client
control over settlement), 5.6(b) (on restrictions on the practice of law), and 1.16 (on
termination of the lawyer-client relationship). Erichson & Zipursky, supra note 7, at 284–90.
Professor Baker offers a contrary interpretation. Baker, supra note 83, at 1962–65.
103. See Rave, supra note 1, at 1210.
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lawyers, not the claimants themselves.104 Without lawyers willing and able
to press (and finance) their claims outside of the settlement, claimants have
little ability to threaten the defendant enough to achieve a superior result.
Thus, as Professor Richard Nagareda explains, claimants’ ability to exit an
undesirable settlement depends on alternative lawyers’ ability to enter the
market and seek such claimants as clients.105 MDL settlement designers
seeking closure may therefore include settlement terms designed to disrupt
the market for legal services for claimants who wish to sue outside the
settlement.
A. Lawyer Agreements Not to Sue
Agreements that participating lawyers will not bring similar claims
against the defendant in the future are an effective way to get the major
players out of the business. They make it harder for new claimants (or
nonsettling claimants in search of new representation) to find a competent
lawyer, and thus they promise the defendant some degree of closure. But
express agreements by lawyers not to bring future claims violate the ethical
rules in most states as impermissible restrictions on the practice of law.106
Therefore, MDL settlement designers have taken other approaches.
Some MDL settlements require participating lawyers to affirm that they
have “no present intention” of soliciting new clients with similar claims.107
Because such provisions say nothing about what the lawyers’ intentions
may become in the future and do not stop lawyers from taking clients who
approach them, they do not appear to have any teeth. But “no present
intention” provisions may be a way for plaintiffs’ lawyers to signal to
defendants that they are effectively out of the business. Repeat-player
lawyers may not want to develop a reputation for breaching such tacit
understandings if they hope to be dealmakers in future MDLs.108
Another alternative is for the defendant to retain major plaintiffs’ lawyers
as consultants on the settlement’s implementation in an attempt to use the
ethics rules to conflict them out of future representations.109 But several
courts and bar associations have frowned on this approach,110 and, in any
event, there may be too many plaintiffs’ lawyers who present credible
threats to make such a strategy effective in an MDL.

104. See supra notes 69–70 and accompanying text.
105. Nagareda, supra note 44, at 169.
106. MODEL RULES OF PROF’L CONDUCT r. 5.6(b) (AM. BAR ASS’N 2016); see also
RESTATEMENT (THIRD) OF THE LAW GOVERNING LAWYERS § 13(2) (AM. LAW INST. 2000);
ABA Comm. on Ethics & Prof’l Responsibility, Formal Op. 93-371 (1993); Baker, supra
note 83, at 1958.
107. E.g., Fosamax Settlement, supra note 15, § 77; AMS Settlement, supra note 20,
§ IV.S.
108. See Baker, supra note 83, at 1960; Burch, supra note 7; Burch & Williams, supra
note 7.
109. See, e.g., Erichson, supra note 7, at 998–99; William H. Simon, The Market for Bad
Legal Advice: Academic Professional Responsibility Consulting as an Example, 60 STAN. L.
REV. 1555, 1580–81, app. II (2008).
110. See Baker, supra note 83, at 1959.
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B. Restrictions on Lawyer Advertising
Although legal ethics rules bar lawyers from expressly agreeing not to
bring future claims, some settlements, like the AMS mesh products
settlement, have required participating lawyers to agree not to advertise for
new clients with similar claims against the defendant.111 Restrictions on
lawyer advertising add some teeth to “no present intention” provisions, and
they hinder competition in the market for legal representation, making it
harder for claimants dissatisfied with the settlement—and their own
lawyers’ endorsement of it—to find new lawyers. And advertising
restrictions work in conjunction with lawyer-withdrawal provisions to
encourage claimants to opt in to the global settlement. If competing
lawyers cannot advertise for new clients, dissatisfied claimants may not
know that they have an alternative to opting in.112
Of course, if barriers to entry are low, new lawyers not bound by the
settlement agreement may enter the market and advertise aggressively for
dissatisfied claimants. But if barriers to entry are high, then restrictions on
lawyer advertising can make lawyer-withdrawal provisions more coercive
for clients.
C. Restrictions on Referral Fees
Targeting the referral market is another way make it harder for
dissatisfied claimants to find representation outside of the settlement. The
Vioxx settlement, for example, required participating lawyers to agree to
forgo any financial interest in any eligible claim that did not opt in to the
settlement.113 This meant that not only were lawyers prevented from
representing nonsettling clients, but they also could not take referral fees for
sending those clients to another lawyer.
Requiring lawyers to forgo their financial interests in nonsettling claims
does not directly affect the client’s decision calculus. Indeed, it might even
make it cheaper for the client to reject the settlement and sign on with a new
lawyer because the previous lawyer would not be entitled to any share of
the fees. But it does create an incentive for the original lawyer to pressure
the client to opt in to the settlement because that is the only way the lawyer
can get paid for any work on behalf of that client.
More importantly, the requirement that lawyers forgo any financial
interest in nonsettling claims disrupts the referral market because the
original lawyer has no financial incentive to help dissatisfied clients find
new lawyers. And, without referrals, dissatisfied claimants may have
difficulty finding competent new lawyers to represent them outside of the
settlement. Therefore, settlement provisions that prevent lawyers from
111. AMS Settlement, supra note 20, § IV.S (“Claimants Counsel further represent that
they will not actively solicit prospective Pelvic Mesh clients via television, radio, or website
advertisement or other public or professional media outlets, either directly or indirectly
through affiliates.”).
112. See Burch, supra note 7, at 93.
113. Vioxx Settlement, supra note 16, § 1.2.8.2.
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taking referral fees for nonsettling clients reinforce lawyer-withdrawal
provisions, making them more effective at achieving closure and more
coercive from the clients’ point of view.
CONCLUSION
MDL dealmakers gravitate toward closure provisions because peace has
value for defendants in mass litigation. Lawyers who can deliver peace
through a global settlement can demand a premium for their clients. But
the defendant’s willingness to pay for peace also creates a strategic dynamic
where—unless there is some cramdown mechanism—holdouts can threaten
to wreck the deal in an attempt to capture a premium for themselves.
Closure provisions that prevent strategic holdouts benefit everyone—
claimants and defendants alike—as the defendant can put more money on
the table, and the surplus can be allocated among the parties instead of
siphoned off by strategic players. But closure provisions that make it
difficult for claimants with strong claims to protect themselves by refusing
to participate in a global settlement create risks that the dealmakers—the
defendant and the PSC—will exploit those claimants and appropriate the
peace premium for themselves. Ideal closure provisions would stop
strategic players while protecting the ability of claimants who genuinely
have strong claims to bargain for adequate compensation. In other words,
they would disfavor holdouts but protect “hold-ins.”114 The trick is trying
to distinguish between the two, and that is not easy to do.
Some closure provisions in MDL settlements have tried to target strategic
behavior. The DePuy good faith lawyer-expulsion provision and the BP
sealed walk-away threshold, for example, appear to target strategic
holdouts, while allowing claimants who have genuine problems with the
settlement to refuse to participate. To get those claimants to participate, the
defendant will have to sweeten the deal and share a little bit more of the
peace premium with claimants.
The more troubling closure provisions impair the value of litigating
claims outside of the settlement and alter the market for legal services so
that no competing lawyer has sufficient incentives to challenge the deal. A
strong lawyer-recommendation provision reinforced by an inventoryexpulsion provision and a sophisticated lawyer-withdrawal provision
coupled with barriers to competition or restrictions on referral fees, like
those in the Vioxx settlement, present a significant risk that even claimants
who are significantly undercompensated in the global settlement will have
little choice but to go along with it.
No publicly available MDL settlement since Vioxx has contained as
sophisticated or as powerful a combination of closure provisions. The
closest imitator, the AMS mesh products settlement, had an ethical out in its

114. Some scholars refer to individuals who refuse to participate for genuine reasons as
“hold-ins.” See, e.g., Gideon Parchomovsky & Peter Siegelman, Selling Mayberry:
Communities and Individuals in Law and Economics, 92 CALIF. L. REV. 75, 128–29 (2004).
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attorney-withdrawal provision and targeted only attorney advertising, not
the referral market.115
So did closure provisions make the Vioxx settlement a bad deal? It is
difficult to tell, as an outsider, how big the peace premium in any given
case is and how much of it goes to claimants instead of being divided
among the defendants and lawyers. And there is no a priori reason to deny
the defendant and negotiating lawyers a share of the peace premium.116
After all, the bundlers who make peace possible need to share in the gains
in order to incur the transaction costs of bundling.117 The $4.85 billion that
Merck paid to settle the Vioxx claims is a lot of money. But when not
participating in the settlement is effectively no choice at all—and there is no
other mechanism for claimants to voice their disapproval of the settlement
(such as the ALI’s voting model)—we need to worry that the dealmakers
may be doing more than simply pocketing the peace premium. They may
be exploiting claimants.
The risk that MDL dealmakers may use closure provisions to foist an
unattractive deal on claimants is not an argument against global settlements
in MDLs. It is not even an argument against the use of closure provisions
in MDL settlements. Closure may be a precondition to settlement, and
closure provisions can be critical to disabling strategic holdouts. But the
potential for misuse of closure provisions may support MDL judges taking
a more active role in supervising and evaluating the fairness of global
settlements in even nonclass MDLs. Given how hard it can be for
claimants to tell a good deal from a bad one and the risks of lawyer
disloyalty, the MDL judge—who, by the settlement phase, will often be
intimately familiar with the details of the litigation—may be in the best
position to tell whether the peace the settlement provides is worth the
price.118
As I have argued elsewhere, MDL judges do not need the formal power
to reject a settlement (like a class action judge acting under Rule 23(e)) in
order to weigh in publicly on the settlement’s fairness.119 The signal that
the judge sends by expressing an opinion on the deal’s fairness is a
powerful tool for getting information into the hands of claimants—
information that they need to evaluate their lawyers’ performance and
loyalty.120 Because the success of an MDL settlement ultimately depends
on obtaining buy-in from claimants, the MDL judge’s expressed skepticism
toward the dealmakers’ choice of potent closure provisions without
obtaining a sufficient premium for claimants in return may be enough to
derail the settlement. An MDL settlement—even one with closure
115. AMS Settlement, supra note 20, §§ IV.B, IV.I, IV.S.
116. See Robert G. Bone, Replacing Class Actions with Private ADR: A Comment on
“Settlement, ADR, and Class Action Superiority,” 5 J. TORT L. 127, 134 (2014) (“[T]he
substantive law does not give plaintiffs any right to benefit from a peace premium or impose
any obligation on the defendant to pay it.”).
117. Rave, supra note 1, at 1216 n.122.
118. Bradt & Rave, supra note 12, at 7.
119. Id. at 7, 21, 32–35.
120. Id. at 28–32.
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provisions—becomes a tough sell once the judge has publicly declared it
unfair. But for judges to play this role effectively, they need to understand
how closure provisions work. I hope this taxonomy helps them do that.

